

Review of INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

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Rade VLKOV

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BALKAN ECONOMISTS COOPERATE

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VATICAN — SOUTH SLAVS

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Chief Editor:
RADE VLKOV

Edited by:
THE EDITORIAL BOARD

Published by
THE FEDERATION OF YUGOSLAV JOURNALISTS

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Rade VLKOV

to wish to establish a truly free and democratic society, not in contradiction to the principles of the United Nations Charter. The Balkan peoples will be fully aware of the importance of this agreement and its contribution to the further development of the Balkan area.

YUGOSLAVIA-TURKEY-GREECE POLICY

After long and difficult negotiations, an agreement was reached in 1953 and 1954 for a common field of work which will yield mutual benefit and mutual progress and will bring about a genuine and lasting peace and stability. This is a great achievement which can be everyone's pride.

Tripartite Alliance

THE BALKAN AREA

THE Balkan area has always been considered as a significant and unusually susceptible unit of Europe's political geography. This, indeed, was true in the past, and it is true today. The instability and insecurity of the Balkan countries — described as "the European powder keg" — was in the past due, not so much to the fact that they occupy a geographical position in which the interests of foreign powers conflict, as to their mutual enmity and the inability of their governments to realize that they would best serve the interests of their region by working together for its independence and free development. True, there were attempts to establish regional cooperation between the Balkan peoples, but they all failed because they were initiated by individual groups of powers from abroad, which wanted to fit the Balkans into their own political plans. As history shows, the Balkan people were many times ready to cooperate in the defence of their common interests, but the immaturity of their governments never allowed that readiness to develop into a powerful force through firm and lasting treaties. As a result, they had to undergo many hardships, and pay for their disunity with great losses in human lives and material wealth.

A BASTION OF PEACE IN EUROPE

Though in view of the present circumstances and relations in Europe the Balkan region is still susceptible and exposed, it is no longer a "powder keg". The character of the relations which are now being developed between Greece, Turkey and Yugoslavia — which cover most of the Balkans — and the aims of their cooperation are gradually turning the Balkans into a bastion of peace in Europe. The task the governments of the three countries are carrying out in complete equality, mutual understanding and confidence, and with the full support of their peoples, who are aware of their common interests, is bringing about an international community, the like of which has never existed in this part of the world. In an unprecedentedly short period, from February 1953 to June 1954, the three countries have accomplished great work and expanded their cooperation to all fields of human endeavour. First they concluded an agreement to pool their resources, so as to set up a more effective system of defences against aggression, and to preserve peace and security in this part of the world, and now they have decided to expand that agreement into a formal alliance and strengthen security in the spirit of the United Nations Charter.

With this historical decision, which was taken during President Tito's visits to Turkey and Greece, the Balkan peoples entered a new era, a period in which the results achieved will be consolidated and strengthened, and in which the three countries' relations will have a favourable influence on international security and reconciliation. The legend of the "powder keg" and the unfortunate policy which was pursued when the Balkan area was considered to be a synonym for weakness and insecurity as well as an ideal hunting ground for all military adventurers, have given way to the new reality, in which the Balkan countries are a powerful factor of stability, peace, security and independence. The basis of the new relations in the Balkans is and will continue to be the Tripartite Alliance.

PRINCIPLES OF THE TRIPARTITE ALLIANCE

The elements which have made possible so rapid and successful a development of the tripartite relations are to be found in the fact that the Balkan Alliance is a product of the vital needs of the peoples of Greece, Turkey and Yugoslavia. This Alliance fully corresponds both to the immediate and long-term interests of the three countries which, owing to their wish to live in peace and freedom, and the need to speed up their economic, technical and cultural progress, have ample reasons to go on working for ever closer cooperation. The peoples of the three Balkan countries are aware that their work will produce lasting results, because all their actions and agreements are founded on progressive principles, the most important of which is the equality of all three countries, none of which has a privileged position or leading role within the Alliance. The independence of the three countries; the strengthening of the independence of their region in international relations; the defensive character of their military pact, which will never be used for aggressive purposes but only for the defensive needs of the Balkans — these are the foundations of the alliance of the three countries, and they will pave a way for its success and affirmation. Viewed from this angle, the tripartite cooperation appears as a lasting process, which is already being pointed out as an example to be followed by other countries which have not yet succeeded in finding suitable forms and principles for mutual cooperation in the defence of their independence and security.

Furthermore, the development of Balkan cooperation is of particular importance — moral, political and practical — because it unites countries with different social and politi-

tical systems. In social order and in ideology Yugoslavia differs from her partners in the Alliance, but her specific position and internal development were no reason for neglecting the present world situation and problems. On the contrary, it was shown in practice, in the tripartite relations, that equality of countries is the primary condition for successful cooperation in organizing the defence of their common interests. Unequal relations in an alliance, and possible violations of the independence of individual countries cannot produce strength and vitality, but only weakness and instability, and so they decrease its power of resistance against aggressive threats. Accordingly, the possibility of cooperation at the highest level between countries with different and even contrasting systems can no longer be doubted; for such cooperation has become reality to be seen in the Balkans as a living proof that the causes of friction, disagreements, tension and armed conflicts do not originate in differences of ideology and system. Such causes must be sought where they can really be found: in the unpacific intentions and hegemonic demands of individual powers.

EUROPEAN CHARACTER OF THE ALLIANCE

Opinions are voiced that the time has come for peoples to lessen and even give up altogether their efforts to organize effective systems of collective defence, because the recent relaxations in international tension have allegedly opened a period of peace and security. Fortunately, a majority of countries, including Greece, Turkey and Yugoslavia, do not share such opinions, and consider that surprises and new tensions are still possible. They hold, therefore, that this period of relaxation should be made use of by the peaceloving people to start, with a maximum of energy, the work on strengthening Europe's stability and establishing the necessary relations against which all aggressive attempts would be of no avail.

The problem of establishing such relations, that is, the problem of finding suitable solutions which would harmonize national and regional interests with the general interests of progress, security and peace in Europe, has constituted the greatest problem for many statesmen, and now takes an important place in the objectives of many countries. The countries which, owing to their geographical position, comprise the central group, are trying to find forms and formulas for mutual cooperation, including various forms of integration, and are doing everything to eliminate their differences and contradictions. The idea of inter-European cooperation, despite many shortsighted conceptions which are being put forward, is increasingly figuring in plans for Europe's future.

But though the necessity and usefulness of such cooperation are recognized, the work on organizing Europe's security is progressing too slowly and with too much uncertainty as to the success of the actions started. Though relations in Europe and in the world do not justify any hesitation and slackness in this work, the necessary decisions have not yet been taken, only because wishes for realizing narrow national interests are in many places much stronger than feelings of obligation towards the international community. Meanwhile the three Balkan countries have succeeded in finding favourable and practical forms and principles for their all-round cooperation, advancing thus general security in their region, which is one of the most exposed sections of Europe.

This success is even more important because the cooperation between the three countries is, in spirit, essence and content, not only regional, but European, in character. This cooperation is in fact the first material step in the policy Europe is striving for, a step which is of exceptional importance as regards the role of our Continent in interna-

tional relations. The Balkan cooperation will be still further advanced with the formation of the proposed tripartite consultative assembly, which each of the three Parliaments will delegate 20 deputies. In this way Balkan cooperation will enter a higher form of association, in which directly elected representatives of the people will debate on all matters of internal and foreign policy and pass corresponding recommendations. And so the three countries will make yet another contribution to the efforts which are being made to establish wider cooperation between the European countries.

ITALY'S ANTI-EUROPEAN POLICY

Unlike the Balkan countries of the past, when, owing to their weakness and disunity, they were a factor of European instability and unrest, today the three Balkan countries, pursuing a European policy, form one of the pillars of Europe's security, peace and stability. The peoples of Greece, Turkey and Yugoslavia have been praised for their work by all those who place the interests of peace, independence and prosperity in Europe above all secondary considerations. But people who subordinate Europe's prosperity to their own calculations and plans have been bitterly opposing this work of organizing a peaceful community in the Balkans. Among these are the Italian policy makers who are trying in a variety of ways to link the Trieste problem with the Tripartite Alliance, to show that the Alliance is anti-Italian in character and so undermine this bastion of peace in the Balkans with its efforts to build up better relations among nations, which would enable our Continent to move from its present position, towards peace and security.

Even if Italy did not obstruct the setting up of the European Defence Community, her obstructive actions against tripartite cooperation in the Balkans would be enough to show that her policy goes against the interests of Europe as a whole, and that it gives direct assistance to the Soviet Union in its endeavours to prevent and check the process of Europe's stabilization and the strengthening of collective security. Any yielding, therefore, to Italian pressure would be a gain for the policy which is trying to undermine our Continent's security and progress.

Review of INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Issued Every First and Sixteenth of Month

Published by
THE FEDERATION OF YUGOSLAV
JOURNALISTS

Chief Editor:
RADE VLKOV

Edited by:
THE EDITORIAL BOARD

OPINIONS ON ACTUAL PROBLEMS

Dr. Rikard LANG

Professor of Zagreb University

Balkan Economists Cooperate

MANIFOLD close and allied relations are being promoted at a rapid pace between the three Balkan countries, Turkey, Greece and Yugoslavia. In addition to political and military cooperation, economic cooperation is gaining increasing prominence. Article IV of the Ankara Agreement, concluded in the beginning of last year, is an eloquent proof of the intention of the three countries to devote their common efforts in the purpose of fostering close economic ties. This aspect of tripartite cooperation, as stated in the joint Greco-Yugoslav communiqué, issued after President Tito's recent visit to Greece, is also to be an important factor in the Alliance which will soon be created.

The development of economic relations so far, particularly since the conclusion of the Ankara Agreement has revealed both the existence of genuine possibilities and the mutual necessity to expand economic relations between these countries. Reciprocal commodity exchange is increasing at a rapid pace, thus entailing new forms of economic cooperation. This was evidenced at the Athens meeting of representatives of the Greek and Yugoslav economist associations which was held at the end of last month.

It is significant and characteristic that the need for cooperation between economists regarding mutual problems of economic development was given prominence. An extremely favourable sign was the decision during the first organised contact between the Yugoslav and Greek economists — which was attended by their Turkish colleagues, on the tripartite basis — to initiate the joint study of the development of economic relations from the standpoint of joint economic development. It was unanimously resolved to study the possibility of coordinating the national efforts with the purpose of inuring the quickest possible economic development in the common interest of all three countries.

There are vast differences between the economies of Greece, Yugoslavia and Turkey, but they have also many points in common. Their outstanding common feature is that, particularly judging by European standards, the three countries are still insufficiently developed economically, as well as the fact that all three are striving to accelerate their economic development as there exist great latent possibilities. Each country has her own programme of economic advancement, although differing in scope and volume, and based on different foundations.

The problem of the economic development of these countries, as well as that of Southern Europe as a whole, exceeds the national, and even regional framework. This was evident at the last, the fifth session of the European Economic Commission, during the discussion on the economic situation in Southern Europe. It was stressed on this occasion that the widening of the disproportion between

the trend of the standard of living in the developed countries of Western Europe, and that in the countries of Southern Europe, including the three Balkan states, which are on a lower level of economic development, constitutes a problem of paramount importance to European life in general.

Greece, Turkey and Yugoslavia therefore proposed, that EEC in conjunction with Italy, should urgently consider measures conducive to the economic development of Southern Europe. It was resolved on this occasion to form a special expert committee of the respective countries which, with the EEC Secretariat, will jointly consider the problems on which the advancement of their forces of production is contingent, and propose the necessary measures.

It will be necessary for the economists of the three Balkan countries to devote special attention to the study of regional measures for the rapid development of their countries and the elimination of difficulties deriving from insufficient economic development. These include deficits in the balance of payments, disproportion between agriculture and industry where their contribution to the national income and the absorption of manpower is concerned, as well as general and specific problems of industrialisation, agrarian over-population, inflationary pressure etc. Apart from this, it is likewise necessary to initiate joint study concerning a problem which regularly accompanies endeavours to speed up economic advancement, i. e. the problem of insuring the necessary financial resources both from internal and external sources. The absence of a more elaborate and detailed analysis regarding the possibilities of regional cooperation constituted a great shortcoming in the approach to the problems of economic development of the Southern European area in the study of EEC referred to.

The structure of Greek, Turkish and Yugoslav foreign trade has many points in common, while the level already attained in the advancement of the forces of production, and the varied and often complementary character of the national resources, make possible a substantial expansion of commodity exchange, particularly in view of the necessity of further economic advancement. There exist vast possibilities for the increase and diversification of mutual commodity exchange. Commodity exports per capita are very low in this part of Europe, amounting to somewhat less than one eighth of the West European average. Experience since the conclusion of the Ankara Agreement, when commodity exchange between Yugoslavia on the one hand, and Greece and Turkey on the other increased rapidly, proved that these possibilities of commodity exchange are genuine. These countries have become increasingly important partners in exchange, although many of the possibilities available have not been exploited, while others are

still insufficiently known. With the general trend of economic development, the existence of a broader Balkan market will become increasingly important to all three countries, so that the coordination of efforts in that direction would be extremely profitable.

The quickened pace of economic development requires greater imports of industrial equipment and raw materials, as well as consumer goods. The present capacities of the three Balkan countries are capable of satisfying these requirements to a major extent, not only by the exchange of various agricultural products and raw materials, but also by the supply of various industrial products, including equipment for industrial development. The Yugoslav heavy and machine industries, as well as the metal, chemical, and electric industries, to list only a few, are already capable of contributing largely to industrial development, and co-operating in the construction of key projects. Here also the problem of financing such an exchange arises. It has already been proved that, owing to financial difficulties, the procuring of equipment presents a problem in the fulfilment of the plan. It will therefore be necessary to examine all the possibilities for the financing of these purchases. It will likewise be necessary to contact the international financial institutions, as it has been proved that the means available are inadequate, even when their use is greatly augmented.

Economic cooperation between Greece, Turkey and Yugoslavia should far exceed the limits of commodity exchange. The fact is that all three countries are currently engaged in promoting their economic advancement. They have already established the fundamental conditions necessary for mutual assistance, thus creating a basis for large scale cooperation (for instance in the execution of major investment projects, the organisation of technical assistance etc.). Other important measures are the mutual use of free capacities in industry, and industrial co-operation in general, which plays a large part in the industrially developed countries and which could also help the insufficiently developed countries to overcome their

difficulties on the road to industrialisation. Limitrophe countries can cooperate by insuring the necessary and adequate power sources, for instance Yugoslav water power could be exploited for electric power exports.

All these possibilities indicate the importance of the joint efforts of economists in the study of the various aspects of economic cooperation between the Balkan countries. Such cooperation is undoubtedly characteristic of the new relations which, as a result of common efforts, are being created in the Balkans. The views of the economists of these countries as to the necessity of studying, not only short-term problems, but also those dealing with long range prospects of economic development is of particular importance. There is no doubt that all the three countries are directly interested in the success of these efforts, while such cooperation as establishes closer links between the economists strengthens the basis of the alliance of the three Balkan countries, whose fundamental purpose is to insure peace.

The objective of the development and expansion of economic relations is not the "autarchic reduction of import requirements" within a regional framework. Moreover, at the Athens meeting of economists, the need was stressed for the study of appropriate forms of cooperation between the three Balkan states and other countries, while the benefits deriving from the joint solution of problems arising in economic relations with other countries (for instance the joint problems of participation in international commodity exchange, the devising of joint solutions of financing problems, etc.) were likewise pointed out. The quickened pace of economic development entails increased goods exchange with foreign countries. This was also clearly indicated by the experience of the Balkan countries so far. Economically advanced Turkey, Greece and Yugoslavia will be far more important partners in European economy than three countries which are still grappling with the difficulties arising from economic under-development, and this is why their progress is important in the development of European economy in general.

François FEJTO

PR of China - a Potential Rival of the USSR

IT seems that the emergence of the PR of China has confronted the Soviets with a dilemma: either to supply China with the help she asked for, or not to help her. To help China implies to strengthen the most dangerous rival; to deny help to her would very likely result in the loss of a valuable ally and force her to look for refuge in the opposing block.

It should be added that the Western World was confronted with the same dilemma when deciding upon the policy to be pursued towards the PR of China, for should the pressure on Mao-Tse-Tung's China be increased, this would almost automatically result in China's greater dependence on Soviet Russia, but should this pressure be alleviated — should aid be given to Mao-Tse-Tung in the hope that he may then part company with the USSR, there is a danger that such a policy would increase the chances of the victory of Chinese Communism in Asia. It is evident that problems of this kind cannot be easily solved.

IMPERFECT COHESION

This double dilemma undoubtedly helps us to explain the complicated and contradictory events which took place during the first weeks of the Geneva Conference. It is true that the dilemma did not enable us to see the gaps in relations between China and the Soviet Union. The too conspicuous disagreements among the Western Powers enabled Molotov and Chou En-Lai to convey an impression of complete harmony. Complete harmony, yes, but with some differences. In fact, the observers were struck by the differences in tone and conduct of these two delegations. Molotov impressed observers by his moderation and his conciliatory spirit. Chou En-Lai, chief of the Chinese Delegation, was the symbol of revolutionary rigidity and inelasticity.

The observers at the Geneva Conference recalled the

memory of another Conference — that held in Paris in 1946. Then, too, some people thought that Molotov was working in concert with Kardelj. Two years later it became evident that the disagreements between the Soviet Imperialism and the young Yugoslav Communism were real, and that the "monolithic" character of international Communism was nothing but a myth cultivated by the Kremlin.

Taking everything into consideration, it seems clear that Soviet policy towards the PR of China is dominated by the desire to escape a repetition of the "Tito affair". Soviet policy is always on the look-out for Chinese sensibilities. The Soviets wish to convey the impression that they are treating China as a completely equal ally. Are they successful in this endeavour? We are not at all sure of that. For the Soviets became accustomed, during the reign of Stalin, to treat their foreign comrades as primitive people in need of their help, protection and leadership. Stalin inspired his cadres with a real "elder brother" complex. To question the superiority of the USSR, to fight against it, amounted, in the eyes of the Russians, to the worst heresy. Reik, Kostov, Slansky, and Patrashkanu were sentenced to death for their disrespect of this mentality.

Mao-Tse-Tung had plenty of time to get acquainted with this mentality and he probably took all the precautionary measures. When dealing with Mao Tse-Tung, the problem has to be treated from a different angle. He does not owe his victory, or does not owe it chiefly, to the Soviet Army. Chinese Communism, just as Yugoslav one, is a national Communism in the sense that it achieved its victory and still remains in power thanks to its own forces. It is true that the Chinese Communists admit that their country is lagging behind the Soviet Union in the political, cultural, technical and economic fields, but they are also conscious of the original character of their revolution, of their numerical superiority (500 millions of Chinese compared to 210

millions of Soviets), of the bright prospects of their economic development and of the importance of their strategic position. That is why they do not allow themselves to be treated as satellites. It is impossible to imagine that Peiping would consent to be ordered about from Moscow in the way that is tolerated by Sophia or Budapest.

The two governments are trying to co-ordinate their policies, just as Washington and London are. This co-ordination covers the ideological field as well. That Peiping is independent of Moscow is best evidenced by the attitude of Peiping towards the problem of "collective leadership". All the Soviet satellites have already adopted the post-Stalinistic formula that the functions of the chief of the Government (Malenkov) and those of the chief of the Party (Khrushchev) must be kept separated. Mao Tse-Tung, however, is at the same time the Premier of the Central Government, the head of the Military and the Revolutionary Council, the Central Committee of the Party, the Politbureau and the Secretariat. The power of Mao Tse-Tung, at least for the time being, appears to be greater than that of Malenkov.

IMPORTANT BUT CALCULATED HELP

The chief problem of Sino-Soviet relations is the following: it is true that the Chinese are inferior to the Russians as regards their equipment, productive forces and technical personnel, but they could surpass them if adequate help is given to them. Are the Russians in a position to help them? Are the Russians willing to do so? It would be wrong to underestimate the importance of the aid which the Russians are giving to China for the reconstruction of her economy. In 1945, the Soviets dismantled the industrial equipment of Manchuria. They are now repairing the losses, giving the Chinese equipment which will enable them to use the furnaces at Anchon. After the death of Stalin, his successors promised China to increase the aid already promised by Stalin in 1950 to supply that country with the equipment necessary for the setting up of 141 major plants. Thousands of Soviet specialists have come to Peiping to help reconstruct railways and strategic roads, to exploit oil in Sinkiang, Manchuria etc. China, for her part, is sending tens of thousands of workers and students to Russia to specialize there.

All this should not be underestimated. It is far from enough, however, when compared to the enormous needs of China.

The Chinese people are probably wondering whether their allies will do all in their power to help them — and whether they are willing to do so?

DISAGREEMENTS AND JOINT INTERESTS

Mao Tse-Tung is an experienced man. His knowledge of the Russian mentality and of the methods of the Kremlin make him cautious. He cannot afford to ignore the fact that the Soviet Union, as regards foreign policy, is always anxious to achieve its own strategic ends, even when dealing with "friendly" countries. Stalin always wished to see the

"friendly" nations become his weak satellites, disunited, and therefore easily controlled by him. The ambiguous Soviet policy towards the Chinese revolutionary movement may be explained by the fact that a neutralized, internally divided China would better suit the interests of the Soviets than a united China, ruled by a strong government. The USSR would prefer a weak China even to a China governed by a strong Communist government.

This is quite understandable when we take into consideration that, contrary to official propaganda, the relations between the two countries are full of conflicts. Sino-Soviet relations in Outer Mongolia are traditionally conflicting, especially since that country became a Soviet satellite. It is the same in Chinese Turkestan (Sinkiang), where the Russians are doing all in their power to turn this country into a Soviet Ruhr. Manchuria is another such area, being the country through which pass the communications between Siberia and the Soviet regions lying along the coast.

It is true that the Russians made a great concession by ceding to the Chinese a part of the Changchun railway line. But they still hold Port Arthur. On the other hand, the division of the spheres of interest between China and the Soviet Union in South and South-Eastern Asia has already become a source of conflict. The Chinese consider themselves to be the "natural leaders" of the colonial and semi-colonial peoples in their struggle for national independence. Mao Tse-Tung is advising them to resort to insurrection and civil war. The Chinese exercise a strong influence on the Communist movements in Korea, Indo-China, Indonesia, Malaya, Burma etc. The Chinese run counter to the Soviet interests there, as the Soviets are advising the Asiatic revolutionaries to adopt a more moderate course of action. It seems that the Kremlin is now much more in favour of intrigues than of insurrections, believing that the former are more effective. Soviets are anxious not to be involved in any new international complications. It is not at all certain that the Russians are willing to allow China to "lead" the revolutionary movements in Asia.

From all these difficulties, concealed and open, present and future, can we draw the conclusion that a break in Sino-Soviet relations is bound to come? Such a conclusion would be premature. Although the interests of these two countries — of the two revolutions and expansions — often conflict, they still have some common ends which prompt them to seek unity and co-operation.

For the Soviets, friendship with China, although full of risks, means the end of a long period of international isolation. The victory of Mao Tse-Tung, which meant the end of hostile pressure on the eastern frontiers of the USSR, has enabled the Soviet Union to consolidate its achievements in Europe. This is valuable aid China sees in the United States, which are supporting Chiang Kai-shek, and Syngman Rhee and are helping the reconstruction of the Japanese military forces, its chief enemy, which it could not oppose without the help of the Soviet Union.

This situation would be changed should the relations between China and Western Powers improve. But even then neither the West nor Russia would have any special interest in speeding up the strengthening of China.

Milan BARTOŠ

Problems of the International Organizations

A GREAT dispersal of forces and lack of coordination between national and international organizations is felt in all the countries in the world which follow the work of the United Nations and other international organizations, particularly specialized Agencies.

This has several times prompted both the Economic and Social Council and the UN General Assembly to ask that member States should take steps, within the framework of their internal regulations for the coordination of official activities on the international plane and try to coordinate private enterprise for assistance and cooperation with the United Nations Organization and other inter-Government organizations.

It happens that various government departments of one and the same country appear at international conferences as quite separate units, ignoring the fact that only a

country as a whole can belong to an international forum, and that membership of individual state organizations or institutions does not exist. This phenomenon is noticeable especially in Specialized Agencies. Hence the member-states are requested to determine precisely who is the correspondent of that country for individual inter-government organizations and to suspend all other channels of communication with these organizations. In spite of this, however, the same questions are often treated, not only in various inter-government organizations and Specialized Agencies, but also in the UN General Assembly. In such cases many countries find themselves labouring under internal plane. As various correspondents act for various inter-government organizations, it may happen that these correspondents convey the will of the state in different ways by taking different attitudes on the same questions. It also happens

regularly that various institutions, when making statements on individual subjects in the Specialized Agencies, refer only to technical points, ignoring the general political aspect, so that there is complete disagreement between the attitude of a country in the Specialized Agency and the definitive attitude of that country in the General Assembly.

These were the reasons why the General Assembly appealed to the states to be more vigilant in coordinating government standpoints in international life. It is clear that the General Assembly which is chiefly in the hands of politicians and diplomats, declared itself in favour of the centralization of the national attitude towards foreign countries, implying that in such matters the technicians, who mainly represent the states in the Specialized Agencies, should be subordinated to the control of statesmen and diplomats. Many countries adopted this resolution of the United Nations and strengthened the centralized control of the government organizations which represent the country abroad. In contrast to this, a series of national commissions have been set up in this country for dealing with individual questions of intercourse with foreign countries. These commissions are free from the influence of the State Secretariat for Foreign Affairs, and their concrete policy is not always in harmony with the general line of the government. This is quite understandable as these commissions are chiefly concerned with technical points. This is also the case when individual departments are correspondents of specialized institutions.

This is not confined to Yugoslavia, for there is a similar state of affairs in other countries. The United Nations emphasize that this phenomenon is unsound, not only from the national viewpoint, but also from the international. Other countries cannot clearly visualize the attitude of a country if its representatives in various bodies take different attitudes on the same question. Coordination is one of the absolute imperatives for the proper pursuit of international policy. The UN General Assembly asks all the countries to submit reports about the progress made in this direction, and it will be interesting to examine their replies.

* * *

The Secretary General of the United Nations also drew the attention to private enterprise. It is customary today in all the countries to set up a series of societies whose task is to strive for the realization of the UNO tasks or those of its Specialized Agencies.

But there are many parallel institutions, especially in countries with multi-party systems, which struggle between themselves, transferring this struggle from the national to the international plane. It should be pointed out that this struggle is not always waged for ideological reasons but that divergences not infrequently occur for petty, personal motives, through ambition to keep the initiative or for narrow, technical, it may even be said guild reasons.

Such conflicts are particularly noticeable in cultural institutions which cooperate on the international plane: UNESCO for example embraces the entire international activity in the field of education, culture, science and arts. It is beyond doubt that such a wide sphere calls for a general line of policy. The State delegates are those who define this general line at the UNESCO general conference. Nevertheless UNESCO has a number of institutes, especially a large number of consultative organizations where delegates do not represent the State, but various national federations of private associations. Incredible discrepancies occur between these federations (which are set up chiefly on professional lines) and the general line of UNESCO, for the delegates of the individual federations, free from the influence of their governments, have their own special conceptions and are at variance with the government delegates even as regards the general line of policy. This is especially reflected in the distribution of funds. If the government delegates give priority to education, then various institutes and organizations concerned with questions of art think they should criticize the general policy, or as they say, fight for their special interests. It also happens frequently that conflicts over methods of work are transferred from the internal plane to the international. The State has a definite view of the plan and of the method for its realization. The private delegations, however not only look with disapproval on the work of the official delegation, but even sharply criticize its work and attempt in their consultative role to impose their own conceptions on the general conference. The questions as to how exchange of students should be organized involves as many as there are branches of study in which the exchange is planned. As regards the question of the translation of various works with the

support of central funds, each one strives for the victory of his own ideas. At this moment a question of immediate moment is whether the universal convention on copyright should be abolished or not. In the inter-Government organizations there are so many contradictory opinions that a single view cannot be crystallized nor can a picture be obtained of the general attitude in any individual country, as various organisms of one and the same State entertain the most varied conceptions.

The Secretary General is of the opinion that it would be a good thing if individual countries set up private centralized federations to include all the national associations which have a claim to work on the international plane and possess authorization for that.

In our country there is not a single body suitable for effecting this unification. It is said that the Foreign Relations Commission of the Executive Committee of the Socialist Alliance of the Working People of Yugoslavia could carry out this task, as practically all associations are collectively members of the Socialist Alliance. This might be considered but the Commission in question is not authoritative but consultative. Also, the views of the individual non-government organizations are so different from each other, and their general policies so wide apart that complete divergence is frequently displayed in their pursuit of a general line.

The Secretary General also established that the significance of cooperation on the international plane does not lie in the fact that all countries should be represented with numerous delegations at every session of an international character. Many of these delegations take no part in the work of these conferences. It would be better, a report points out, if the funds used for these journeys were devoted to effective international cooperation, although the journeys are useful in themselves, as people are drawn closer to each other through personal contact. International congresses were often attended by dozens of national associations from many countries. As far as we are concerned these words strike near home, for many of them apply to us. The remark of the Secretary-General, that the submission of properly arranged, correct and documented information and reports, free from the customary phrases, and raised to a concrete level, is more important than the presence of numerous delegates at such international congresses is particularly applicable to us. It sometimes happens that the delegates of our associations after explaining that they cannot agree about the report, take no part whatever in the work of the congresses, thus abstaining from estimating the basic attitude, and from giving an account of the situation in our country.

It happens also that certain international manifestations are attended by many representatives of our associations, often one from each of our Republics, but that the actual representation makes no impression. There were 62 Yugoslav participants at a librarians' congress in Vienna, but none of them submitted a report that might have drawn international attention.

Although we are of the opinion that the State should not interfere without urgent reasons in the activity of these social organizations, we still consider that interests of the State should be considered in this respect. Each of these journeys involves the expenditure of national funds, especially foreign exchange funds. Hence the number of participants and their actual participation in the work is a question which must not be neglected. Control should be exercised in this matter, and coordination of work carried out in order to prevent supererogatory action. But it is a question how to organize the whole business. We believe that the time of administrative measures is over in this field, and think that the recommendation of the Secretary-General of UNO should be taken in our country to mean that the social organizations themselves, that is, international organizations of the non-Government type, regardless of their class, should form a federation which would exercise social control over their work, guided in this action by the principles of social management. We do not deny the existence of high social and patriotic consciousness among all those who represent our public as representatives of social organizations, but we do not believe that there can be order in this respect unless they organize themselves. The State can use its influence where it provides material means, but this is not always the case. Most of the social organizations are finally strong enough to afford the journeys of their delegates. That is why these cases remain uncoordinated and they should be coordinated by the social organizations themselves through the creation of a federation.

European Socialist Perspectives

THE ultimate aim of all democratic-socialist parties — regardless of where they wage their battles for the interests of the working class — is to overthrow the capitalist system and to build up a socialist order in its stead. Socialists, however, differ in their ideas as to how this aim ought to be achieved, merely because they are under the influence of the most variable social, national and economic circumstances.

In this article we shall limit ourselves to a discussion of the European situation and to an assessment of the possibility of invigorating the democratic-socialist forces at this stage of political development. The first thing the Socialists must admit is the fact that the socialist parties of Europe made no progress after the Second World War. In Western Germany this is fully recognized, and, after September 6, 1953, a discussion was started with the aim of establishing whether the German Socialist Party (S.P.D.), with its obsolete principles, is in any way capable of increasing its political influence. What this discussion showed was that some of the leading circles consider that a more flexible and undetermined policy, which would meet with the approval of the petit bourgeoisie, would enable the Party to recruit new members and supporters throughout the nation.

If applied, this idea, no matter how sincerely it might have been conceived, would have bitter repercussions. For never in history has yielding to the insufficiently developed political consciousness of the masses served progress. To give up progressive political principles only to satisfy the demands of the petit bourgeoisie would mean a further weakening of our attitude, and would end in the total elimination of socialist ideas and in the patching up of the capitalist social order. And since the political thought of the leading circles of the Socialist Party exhausted itself between elections for the Federal Parliament in putting up election slogans, it has become increasingly necessary to start a struggle for the formulation of the Party's long-term objectives.

This must, however, be preceded by a thorough study of the world situation, with special reference to the economic strength of the two forces which determine world politics: the capitalist world of the West and the Stalinist state-bureaucratic East. For both of these blocs — if we are to use this term — have their weaknesses and contradictions. In the West the interests of individual nations clash in the economic and other fields. To grasp how true this is we need only remember the differences between France and Germany over the Saar, the disagreements of Great Britain and the United States on the Persian oil issue, and the far-reaching events linked with the Geneva conference. The difficulties in the West are further increased by class differences, the constant and sharp contradictions between capitalism and the working people. Besides this, the capitalist world is subject to economic crises and so can give no guarantees for prosperity.

In the East, the Stalinist bloc, despite its seemingly ideological unity, has its sharp contradictions as well. Due to the totalitarian strength of the Kremlin, work for set political aims there seems to progress more smoothly and with less time wasting than in the West, where the governments are responsible to their national parliaments. But this apparently positive side of the eastern bloc cannot conceal the fact that there are many things out of order in the Cominform states. The economic exploitation of the "People's Democracies", which is carried out by the Soviet Union under the slogan: "Everything for the progress of socialism", shows that the obedient servants of the Kremlin — the leaders of the Communist Parties in the satellite countries, are coming into ever sharper conflict with the interests of the working people. And they themselves cannot but see that their influence is diminishing, gradually but surely.

The most convincing proof of the great contradictions between the interests of the working people and of their leaders who are servile to the Kremlin was given to us on June 17, 1953. The Kremlin itself is well aware of this weakness. The purges in the Kremlin's sphere of interest,

the victims of which are, as a rule, old Communists, are simply the consequence of Moscow's diminishing influence on the people and deliberate manoeuvres to distract the peoples' attention from the difficulties caused by the conflict between the interests of the Kremlin and those of the East European countries, which can no longer be ruled without force. All this shows that the influence of the Communist Parties in the satellite states has greatly weakened. Stalinism, despite its military and political successes in the Second World War, has not succeeded in expanding its ideological influence anywhere in Europe except in France and Italy. The sterility of Soviet influence is now evident everywhere.

Both blocs, as we can see, have their internal weaknesses, and neither of them can be carefree as far as the future is concerned.

If we are to give a review of the present world situation, we must start with the First World War. Before 1914 the capitalist social order was in force throughout the world. But at the end of that war the October Revolution in Russia fundamentally changed the political, economic and geographical face of the globe. After that war the colonial people began to demand their independence and sovereignty. The United States became a banker and, at the same time, economically the strongest power of the world.

The Second World War carried this change still further. The military successes of the Soviet Union created a number of Moscow's satellites, which now stretch from the Black Sea to the Eastern seas. In the colonies, the liberation movements gained in force, shaking the foundations of capitalism more strongly than ever before. The capitalist world lost large raw material bases and markets. In China a great and historical revolution took place, so that political initiative is now slowly shifting to the Asian continent. All these events, detrimental as they are to the West, have caused even greater difficulties because, together with the loss of markets, the productive capacity of the western countries, particularly the United States, has grown enormously. At the end of the war the United States found itself facing the problem of how to market its products, which were 70% greater than before the war, since the need for armaments, as a factor that had been responsible for these increases in production, had ceased to exist. It was this problem that aroused fears among some of the leading circles that America might be heading for an economic crisis. However the war in Korea, and the task the United States took upon itself to rearm the European countries, somewhat decreased these evident difficulties. Even so, the United States is still facing the problem of how to sell its products in the greatly narrowed capitalist world. As a result of this, aggressive intentions are being noticed in responsible American circles which, naturally, determine the country's policy. An active minority of these people advocate a war against the Soviet Union, maintaining that the sooner the United States attacks the USSR the greater will be its chances of winning the war.

However, a decisive majority of the American capitalists, although they are by no means pacifists, consider that a third world war would be a risky adventure. While the First and the Second World Wars brought many economic and political advantages to the United States, a third world conflict would entail certain risks which it has never had to take before. First of all, the advances made in the development of weapons both in the West and in the East might, for the first time in history, bring the operations of modern warfare to the American territory. In that way, the war would become a danger to America's social order. Furthermore, owing to the concentration of forces in only two blocs, the next conflict could not be anything but a total war and, accordingly, a long war. And in such a war, the uncertain role of the American working class could easily become a second factor of risk. Since 1937 the United States trade unions have made great progress, and their struggles have aroused the consciousness of the American people. The horrors of brutal warfare, which would be extended to cities and factories, could easily cause great changes in the social consciousness, and in war and other

difficult conditions, there is very little that divides the peoples' awareness of their economic and of their political strength. Just as the First and Second World Wars fundamentally changed the face of the globe, we may be sure that at the end of the third war conflict the picture of our world would not look same as at its beginning. Therefore the economic needs and the awareness of these risks lead many responsible people in the American economy to the conclusion that war, as the last weapon of politics, should be resorted to only if economic crises and social unrest become dangerous to the social order in the American continent.

POSSIBILITIES OF PREVENTING WAR

The Soviet Union is in a difficult position. Despite the successful industrialization of its national territory, which cannot be denied, it is in no position to satisfy, with its own resources, the needs of the people. It is equally incapable of taking care of its satellites or assisting them economically.

As a result, the Soviet Union today rigorously exploits the satellite states so as to be able to go on with "socialist construction" in the Kremlin's sphere of influence, which comprises almost half of the world. In doing this it comes into conflict with the interests of the working people in the "People's Democracies". The leaders of the Communist Parties, who execute Moscow's orders with blind obedience, are losing the support even of their one-time most loyal followers. That this is true is best shown by political developments in Czechoslovakia. The Communist Party in that country had, no doubt, a large number of followers when it took over power in February, 1948. After the war, Czechoslovakia, whose industries remained intact during the fighting, enjoyed the highest standard of living in Europe. But owing to Soviet exploitation and internal experiments, it was lowered considerably. And today the Czechoslovak people live much worse than before 1948. The dissatisfaction is so great that it was not at all surprising that the 17th of June uprisings in the eastern zone threatened to spread to Czechoslovakia too.

It is hardly worth mentioning the fact that the Soviet Union was unable to turn an industrial country, which enjoyed a Central European standard of living, into a model state which was so necessary to Stalinism, since so far it had succeeded in imposing its influence and system of rule only on industrially backward countries.

In considering the economic basis of social life in the East and West one reaches entirely different conclusions. In the West production greatly surpasses the possibilities of consumption, while the productivity of the East cannot satisfy even the most elementary needs of civilization. Therefore, considering things from the economic point of view, the field to receive the discharge of the tension can only be the capitalist West. But, this, of course, must be further explained. Economic conditions in the Eastern bloc are so bad that the people there cannot afford to waste any time in consolidating the Soviet rule. For the Soviet Union and its satellites will be considered as conquerable until they have exploited and strengthened the Chinese Revolution and its results. To do that they will have to raise, rapidly and noticeably, the standard of living of a nation of 400 million people. The agrarian reform that has already been carried out there is not sufficient, despite the modest demands and the fatalistic vitality of the Asian. Much more must be done when "socialism" is propagated. The Chinese people, after being subjugated to colonial oppression, now expect complete social and national liberation. This, however, can only be done by the industrialization and thorough exploitation of the Chinese raw material resources. But such a task, which must necessarily be extended over decades, is beyond the capability of either China or the Soviet Union.

The question of the Soviet Union's existence and its continuing influence in the East will depend on the degree of success it achieves in the execution of that task. Today the Soviets are in a similar situation to that of 1923, when, in the period of war communism, Lenin had to seek assistance from the surrounding capitalist world, in order to be able to carry out industrialization in the Soviet Union. At that time this political measure was applicable to the territory of the Soviet Union alone, while today it would have to be extended to the whole region of Stalinism, which stretches far beyond the national borders of the Soviet Union. Taking everything into account, the situation is just as bad as it was in 1923, when Lenin called in the capitalists to help him set up the foundations of the future industrialized state.

Molotov's speeches at the Berlin Conference, by which we were once again reminded that the capitalist West could conclude excellent business deals with the East, only confirm what I have said above.

On the other hand, the Western countries, particularly the United States, if they do not wish to give in to the desires of a war-mongering minority to settle all differences by war, will not be able to keep turning down these business offers for long, simply because their present markets are too small. As things stand now, the United States' firm foreign policy, which rests on force, has already been pierced by China's orders with the American automobile industries. Economic needs will, sooner or later, force the United States and other industrialized countries of the West to make use of a new NEP of the Stalinist bloc, unless war, as the last means of politics, is started in the meantime.

But the lessons of the two world wars, which have twice changed the face of the earth, will undoubtedly force quite a number of responsible politicians to do some serious thinking, the more so since the hydrogen bomb stands threateningly at the opposite ends of the world, like scales with equal weights on both sides.

The economic interests of the divided world are complementary, calling for cooperation.

China's admission to the United Nations would presuppose such cooperation, and, besides, it would be a wise step. At present United States' foreign policy is pushing China into the arms of the Soviet Union. An economically independent China would, judging by all the signs, draw away and free itself from the influence of Moscow. For we have seen in Yugoslavia that forces which have fought and acted on their own initiative do not readily submit to Soviet mastery. And experience of the Chinese revolution and the conclusions drawn from it hardly differ from those in Yugoslavia. What then would be more logical than to encourage this tendency. World peace can be preserved only if the Asian problems are settled. All other questions, such as German unification, Austria's peace treaty and the like, would be by-products of such a settlement. Social democracy which is ready to talk in the interests of peace must have this in mind when considering the world situation.

The European socialist parties, too, must take this into account and determine their policies accordingly. So far they have been giving too much time to the national interests of their countries, forgetting to oppose the capitalist groupings of Europe, which are the product of necessity, by a socialist union.

The German Socialist Party acted correctly in rejecting the Schumann Plan. The results of the Montan Union confirmed the correctness of the Party's policy. The trade unions, however, agreed with the Schumann Plan, and thus backed up the Coal and Steel Pool. But they did nothing to oppose that monopolist foundation with a union of miners' and steel workers' trade unions. The European workers, finding themselves in the narrow fields within their national boundaries, have no weapons to fight against this international scheme. This will ultimately force the trade unions to organize the miners and steel workers of the Schumann Plan countries into a single trade union, or at least to set up some sort of workers' community and so raise the economic strength of workers to a higher, continental level. What this involves is the expanding of the national working class forces into a united continental force, which would enable the socialist parties of Europe to stop from going round in circles within the camp of Western capitalism. This continental force would, at the same time, be an effective barrier against the totalitarian demands of Stalinism. The United States fears only two factors of resistance in Europe. They are the Labour Party of Britain and the Socialist Party of Germany. For any of these parties might, under greater political influence, ruin the United States' foreign political plan. The Soviet Union, too, holds these two democratic socialist parties to be the most dangerous opponents of its political aims. The United States and the Soviet Union would, however, encounter a far greater obstruction in a continental socialist party which would be strong enough to get out of the Western camp and resist the totalitarian rule of the East. Therefore we must presently at least discuss the question of such a party — not along the lines propagated by the supporters of the European Defence Community, Henry Spaak, Saragat and others, but as proposed by those who advocate a union of European workers, which would have a much greater influence on the young people than the present socialist parties of Europe.

Roads to European Unity

CONCRETE attempts and aspirations to organise cooperation towards the achievement of large scale European cooperation were manifest in the countries of Western Europe, parallel with the creation of defence alliances and other organisations of joint defence, the development of military potential and armaments, and the drafting of joint plans for the increase of economic power, and the guidance of economic development towards absorption for the military efforts.¹ It was possible to perceive various tendencies and different conceptions in this movement, sometimes vague, general and declarative, sometimes concrete and specific, which mingled, clashed and contrasted, not only in polemics and discussions, but also in preambles and solemn introductory provisions of certain instruments by which various organisations of European cooperation were created.

In some cases these tendencies expressed the old idea of European unity and her integration in a legal and organisational international entity, while they sometimes represented an ideological movement for the defence and promotion of the fundamental political and social conceptions on which the West European system is based. This second tendency was undoubtedly conditioned by the post-war development of the international situation, in which the tactics and psychosis of cold war prevailed.

The movement towards integration was consequently invested with two main objectives, i.e., the integration of individual European countries on the international plane, and the integration of the policies pursued by these European countries in specific fields of political and social activity. On the one hand it strove towards the creation of supra-national organisations, and the creation of certain international ideological coalitions on the other.

In any case it is a fact that the movement for European integration revived rapidly in the period which marked the organisation of European cooperation, either as propaganda for European unity, or as the beginning of its realisation.

This trend towards integration was most concretely expressed in the Coal and Steel Pool which was created on April 18, 1950, as a supra-national European organisation. As is known, this organisation includes Holland, Belgium, Luxemburg, France, Western Germany, and Italy, these six countries having renounced their individual national competence and established a supra-national authority to which this competence was transferred, in the field of production, distribution and sale of coal and steel, and in all matters and branches of industry, economics, finance, trade, social legislation etc. which are affected by the production and marketing of coal and steel.

The Coal and Steel Pool constitutes the first form of integration of the sovereign rights of individual states into a supra-national organisation, the first partial renunciation of absolute sovereignty. This is why this first example was regarded as the precursor of a new international order in Europe. Other fields of economy, such as agricultural production, and other branches in which a supra-national organisation could be established along lines similar to the Coal and Steel Pool, were likewise referred to in optimistic circles favourably inclined towards European integration.

The European Defence Community which the Governments of the same Western countries intended to create by the Treaty signed on May 27, 1952, should have represented another form of European integration. The basic model of this community was the same as that of the Coal and Steel Pool, only transferred to the sphere of national defence. In the field of national defence, military quotas, and armaments the aforementioned states renounced a large measure of their national competence, and instituted a supra-national authority which they invested with these powers.

However, the progress of integration where the six countries of "Little Europe" were concerned was halted at this point. The ratification of the European Defence Treaty encountered great resistance in France, and its fate is still uncertain.

The third manifestation of the idea of European integration was expressed in the conception of a European political community which would represent an integrational organ in the sphere of political authority, namely, a European parliament in which the countries of "Little Europe" would take part, and to whose authority they would partly be subjected. The European Parliament would be the political counterpart of the Coal and Steel Pool and the European Council, and would provide the basis for integration and control of these two communities. It would further mean the introduction of the parliamentary system of the western democracies as the political basis for economic and military integration.

The European Council, which was established prior to all treaties and projects by the Statute of the European Council on May 5, 1949 is another international organisation in the movement of European integration. It is envisaged, at least by some of its members, as an organ which should gradually lead to the ever closer unity of the European countries in all spheres of political, cultural, social and legal activity of its member countries. Judging by its membership it is a far broader organisation than all the others, while operating on entirely different and specific principles. It discusses ideas, studies problems, formulates opinions, advances suggestions and recommendations regarding individual problems of European solidarity, examines questions on which its members might achieve identity of views, reach joint solutions, or pursue a coordinated policy.

Thus a common policy could be pursued on each individual national field.

Although the objectives of the European Council are so broad and lofty, and its debates teeming with such a galaxy of ideas, the results achieved up till now are few and far between. The European Council has still not overcome the crisis inherent in its internal structure, nor has its platform of integration yet mastered the resistance of some of its members towards a supra-national policy.

A specific process of integration is evolving within the NATO framework, in the sphere of practical needs ensuing from the objectives of this organization. It is being implemented by means of joint institutions which will acquire an international or supra-national status through practice. This process made notable headway in the military field after the establishment of the Supreme Command, and the determination of special quotas of NATO forces, integrated defence programmes, etc. A similar trend, although not so

¹ See article "Practice of European Cooperation", No. 99, May 16, 1954, page 12.

obvious, and on a smaller scale, can be noted in the increasingly systematic centralisation of the NATO Civil Service, particularly since the creation of the General Secretariat.

On the other hand, ever since the creation of NATO in Ottawa in 1951, there has been an ever stronger tendency to invest this Treaty with the character of a permanent international organisation, apart from its primary objective of insuring joint defence in case of aggression, thus acquiring the characteristics of an organisation with long-range peacetime objectives. The Ottawa declaration on the aims of NATO is especially characteristic, as it constitutes, politically if not legally a certain amendment of the North Atlantic Treaty. It is stated in this declaration that NATO has been created, not only for the purpose of insuring joint defence, but also lasting cooperation for the wellbeing of the peoples, and that it represents a community of nations which are firmly resolved to safeguard the unity of these aspirations and efforts in peacetime also. A special committee was formed with the task of strengthening NATO through the promotion of economic, social, and cultural ties and consultations on foreign policy problems in general. In the light of these tendencies it may be said that NATO was envisaged as an instrument which would lead gradually towards the integration of Europe, or that part of Europe which it comprises, while this would be achieved through the ever closer cooperation of the joint organs established.

The Ottawa Declaration, however, introduced more new elements into the literature on NATO than into the essence of its organisation. In practice NATO is actually confronted with numerous internal contradictions which ensue from the dissension of its members on many major problems of international policy. This means the ever slower and more difficult process of creating a firm internal unity on which every integrational reform is necessarily based.

The appraisal based on the experience yielded by the practice of these organisations and their policy implemented through joint organs is not particularly favourable to the movement for European unity. Far more progress in this respect has been made in declarations and abstract enthusiasm than in practical results. Even where the principle of European unity was realised in practice, the appearance of internal dissension or different interests, which either existed previously, or were called forth by the policy of integration, indicates that European integration is still premature in view of the present circumstances.

The achievement of integration would necessitate the disappearance of state sovereignty, or at least that it should weaken appreciably. State sovereignty, however, is still a powerful factor of international order, and is so far the only framework within which international relations are really possible.

The era of integration requires greater equalisation of economic conditions than is now the case, as without these conditions integration would actually represent the integration of the small and weak, under this or that form of hegemony, by the big and strong.

As was stated before, the idea of integration was practically applied in the "Little Europe" group, including Western Germany. Contemplated from the practical standpoint the problem of Germany is also one of the obstacles on the road to European integration. If it is hard, for geographical, political, economic and military reasons, to imagine a united Europe without Germany, it is no less difficult to organise it with Germany, on account of the great material and psychological contradictions which prevail in the actual relations of Germany with the other countries of Western Europe, particularly those which were the victims of the former German policy.

These difficulties are best illustrated by the case of the European Defence Community, which should have originally resolved a doubly complicated problem, i. e., that of integrating the German military potential in a community for the defence of Western Europe and at the same time guaranteeing Western Europe against this same military potential. The formula devised to solve this double equation, namely EDC, according to which Western Germany would in some way or other offer sufficient guarantee against itself by participating in the community, failed to satisfy all the future partners of the treaty, and encountered increasingly stiff resistance in France.

Basically this formula is neither devoid of ingenuity nor praiseworthy aims, nor does it lack an adequate mechanism, but it is no less wanting in other conditions, as the perfection of an international organisation does not depend so much on the good quality of its technical mechanism and the resourcefulness of its creators, as on the actual relations between the countries which take part in this organisation. One should bear in mind that there exists a great disproportion between the potential possibilities of Germany and her partners. This tendency is perhaps more difficult to check internally than externally, as she can turn the already stipulated provisions of the treaty on integration in her own favour. During the comparatively short period since the creation of the Coal and Steel Pool, certain inequalities as to the profits derived by its members, and in favour of Western Germany, are already noticeable.

In fact, the principle of integration as applied to the Coal and Steel Pool and in EDC, is less a result of loyalty to this principle, and more a consequence of practical considerations. In both cases there existed a genuine material basis and a real danger which dictated the form of integration, of the Ruhr basin and the steel industry on the one hand, and the German defence potential on the other. The quality of the integrated community will be determined by the role of these material factors in the national life of the associated countries, and in their mutual relations. In any case it seems that, apart from its other shortcomings, the principle of integration is still too ambitious today. Political reality points to other, less ambitious, but more efficient ways, such as cooperation based on equal rights, the coordination of national interests and of the common objectives, which the solidarity of these interests necessitates and makes possible.

PARLIAMENTARY LIFE

Dr. Jovan DORDEVIC

Regulations Governing Real Estate in Yugoslavia

THE last meeting of the Federal National Assembly, held from the 10th till 13th of June, 1954 passed a statute of the general regulations for property in lands and houses regardless of who own them. This law has a much wider significance of principle than its contents show. Besides this, whoever is acquainted with the theory and practice of socialism, cannot fail to realize that the problems of ownership are a decisive factor in the establishment and estimation of the essence of the new society and its general path of development. Ownership, especially ownership of the means of production, dominates human history, and determines the essence and form of the social and political organization of society. In history there never were any actual social changes, or deeper social and political reforms without a definite attitude being taken towards ownership, without successful attempts to define ownership in a less exclusive, less Roman and "sacred way" but in a manner that would be more beneficial for the community, ensuring equal treatment and more freedom for as large a number of people as possible.

TWO BASIC LEGAL FORMULAS

Yugoslavia has not carried out the nationalization of lands nor the nationalization of houses. But on various bases, part of the arable land and building sites, as well as individual buildings, especially in towns, have become social property. Most of the arable land, however, is privately owned. Similarly, the larger part of house property is owned by private persons, although there never was in Yugoslavia a powerful capitalist ownership of buildings. The only exception was the property of various banks, which became nationalized after the nationalization of banks.

Starting from the material basis, the new law differentiates between two basic legal formulas for buildings and lands. The difference between these two formulas is based on the character of the ownership. The first concerns nationalized buildings and lands, and the second privately owned lands and buildings. For the estimation of the characteristics and differences between these two statutes, two basic legal situations are essential: that which touches the legal relation between private persons in respect of the private ownership of land and houses under the new statute on nationalized buildings and lands in the framework of the so-called socialist sector, and the other which appears in the relations between the owner of private property in lands and buildings, and legal bodies of the socialist sector (State organizations, institutions, private enterprises, cooperatives etc.).

SOCIAL AND PRIVATE PROPERTY IN LANDS AND BUILDINGS

The following are characteristics of the regulations regarding nationalized lands and buildings. Agricultural land

which has been nationalized cannot as a rule be transferred to other owners. But the law allows certain exceptions to this rule. As regards building sites, the regulations are even more definite, while for buildings which have been nationalized it is much wider. Nationalized land for building sites cannot be sold to private owners. But definite rights may be acquired on them. These rights are known as the "rights of utilization". Nationalized buildings are, in principle, marketable. The law prescribes certain conditions for this exchange. This law does not undertake to work out in full the regulations for agricultural and building sites under social ownership, that is, it does not finally settle the contents of the "right of management" over these objects under social ownership, nor the method of transference and acquisition under the "right of utilization". All these questions form part of the contents of the new socialist "civil law", that is, the law which replaces and modifies the classical civil law.

The regulations regarding the sale of lands and buildings which are privately owned is quite definite as regards relations between private persons. This exchange is quite free. It abolishes the right of the people's committees to enter into the justifiability of the transference of ownership and to regularise the transference by a special permit. As regards acquisition and sale, the law places social organizations and private persons on an equal footing (social organizations include political, professional, sports and all other organizations). The only exception to this rule are business premises. Social organizations and other associations may sell and buy business premises provided they first obtain the permission of the people's committee. In keeping with the regulations concerning free exchange of privately owned lands and houses, the law retains the principle of the Roman law, which has hitherto been in force in Yugoslavia. According to this principle the sale of privately owned land also involves the transference of ownership of buildings. True, the law permits that different provisions be stipulated in the contract. In contrast to this, the sale of nationalized buildings does not imply that the land on which the building is situated is also transferred to the new owner. The person who has acquired the building, automatically acquires the lasting "right of utilization" on that site as long as the building exists on it.

A special novelty introduced by this law is free sale of component parts of buildings (flats and business premises which are privately owned). In old Yugoslavia the law recognised only the so-called ideal division of private ownership of buildings. Apartment ownership was not legally recognized. The new law permits not only apartment-ownership but also free sale and purchase of flats and other parts of buildings between private persons. These new regulations on private buildings are logically connected with the previous laws which start from the principle that every

citizen is entitled to a flat under the provisions of the law. Apartment ownership is the material substratum of the actual right of the citizen to a house.

The freedom of acquiring agricultural land by private persons is limited to the so-called maximum of land property which the law allows to farmers and other private persons. No restrictions are set on as regards the acquisition of land for building and purchase of houses, but such restrictions exist in factual relations, for the acquisition of a number of houses by a private person is actually limited by the regulations on the social management of housing, which embraces all buildings with more than two flats. The essence of the social management is in that owners of houses receive, as a rule, ten per cent, of the total rent collected, while the rest goes partly to the fund for the maintenance and repair of buildings and partly to the city and municipality fund for the erection of new buildings. Similarly, buildings such as dwellings or groups of flats are not at the disposal of the owner, but of a social management body.

It follows from this that the free exchange of land and buildings which are privately owned does not mean any alteration of the basic premises of the socialist economy and socialist social organization. This free exchange is allowed within definite limits laid down by the socialist state in the interests of its own economic development and its own internal economic and general democratic policy. But the essence of this free traffic is that it does not encourage capitalist tendencies or establishment of certain new sources of exploitation and the enrichment of individuals at the expense of others, or of the community. This is especially reflected in the limits set to free exchange of agricultural areas between farmers and other private persons. As a rule, the farmers may freely sell and acquire private land up to ten hectares. The purchase of land over and above this maximum, it is true, is not prohibited, but the farmer cannot possess land above the fixed maximum. If this happens, the surplus over the legal maximum becomes automatically national property and is included in the appropriate agricultural land fund. The law makes an exception in the acquisition of agricultural property by way of inheritance. If after coming into his inheritance the heir possesses agricultural land above the legally fixed maximum, he will retain the surplus, not as his property, but for temporary utilization. The inheritance law, which is under preparation, will definitely regulate the procedure in connection with the acquisition of land over and above the fixed maximum.

EXCHANGE OF REAL ESTATE BETWEEN PRIVATE PERSONS AND THE SOCIALIST SECTOR

A little more complicated is that other legal situation to which we have referred, and which deals with the sale between private persons and legal bodies of land and houses which belong to the socialist economy, that is, the socialist sector of property. This legal situation differs according to whether it involves the lands or buildings.

We have seen that the law lays down as a principle that nationalized agricultural land property is not negotiable — that it cannot be sold. An exception to this rule occurs when an economic organization (agricultural enterprise or farm cooperative) needs to group its land property in one area for the advancement of its activity, and takes corresponding measures. In such circumstances, the economic organization may exchange land with a private person, or sell to another individual parts of the land under social ownership, but only if it is in a position to do so, and wishes to buy another agricultural property.

As regards buildings, the law permits that an economic organization may sell to a private person only a small building for business which is to be used for agricultural purposes or for the carrying on of a trade. The law permits an economic organization to purchase a building from a private person, but in order to prevent possible abuse, it lays down that the contract for the purchase of a house, as well as for land property, may be cancelled if the sale price surpasses the commercial value of the purchased property by one third, at the time of its purchase.

The competent State authorities and institutions, acting on behalf of the Federation, the People's Republic, the autonomous unit and the local community, may buy all land and buildings from private persons. But as regards land, the regulations are different from those regarding buildings. Agricultural land may be sold by these authorities under the same conditions as are provided by the economic organizations. The land for building sites cannot be sold, but it may be given to individuals for the erection of buildings,

even for permanent utilization, either with or without consideration (payment). On the other hand, these authorities may sell dwelling houses to private persons only if they do not contain more than two flats. An exception is the right of the Federal and Republican Council to sell other dwelling houses as well.

Finally, the clauses of the law concerning the legal position of foreigners in the acquisition of ownership rights in land and buildings are also characteristic. It is a general principle that foreigners in Yugoslavia may, under the conditions of reciprocity, acquire land and houses by inheritance and dispose of them just as Yugoslav citizens, unless the acquisition and disposal of this property is regulated otherwise by international agreements. Besides this, the law authorizes the Federal Executive Council to rule that foreign citizens may acquire real estate on other grounds, apart from inheritance. However, foreign diplomatic and consular representations, as well as organizations and specialized institutions of the United Nations Organization, may acquire buildings for official requirements, no matter whose property they are. They have the same right for the construction of official buildings. The consent of the Federal Executive Council is needed for such a transaction.

Conclusions to be drawn from all these premises can be reduced to those of basic principle. The practical building of a socialist society can be carried out only if the practical, economic and other conditions and circumstances of each country are respected. Any dogmatic or routine settlement of social problems, especially the problems of ownership in the process of the actual building of socialism is dangerous, and may in the end be harmful to the socialist forces and to social progress. Yugoslav theoretical thought and practice have freed the science of socialism from a series of stiff, dogmatic, immature and routine conceptions of either the old theoretical socialist thought or that propagated by the official Soviet theory. On the other hand, the development of socialism and socialist democracy in Yugoslavia has shown that a line must be drawn between those measures and institutions which issue from the realized socialist relations and those which are the result of definite economic, political and other requirements, or to be more exact — backwardness, under-developed conditions, and even the general state of the material and social development of the country. The strength of socialism and socialist development in Yugoslavia lies in the fact that these differences are clearly stated and that the general, material, political and spiritual development is already sufficient today to ensure that these second measures, taken as a whole, do not hamper or prevent the free development of socialist relations in economy and society.

The second conclusion is more concrete: that is, it is a basis for the understanding and estimation of the first, general statement. Land which becomes communal property cannot be a general object of free transaction in a socialist society. The communal ownership of land gradually transforms the land into the concern of everybody and nobody, into a general national property. Hence agricultural land cannot be alienated except in those cases when, owing to the existence of a considerable private land domain, it serves as a means of grouping and strengthening the nationalized land. The degree of socialization is even greater in the case of building sites. Here anybody, under conditions set down by the law, may acquire a new right — the right of utilization. This right of utilization is derived both from the fact of the land being general national property and the personal right of citizens to build and possess their own house, the house being their personal property. These premises indicate the path of the future transformation of the legal regime in land ownership — a path which does not lead to state ownership but makes the land general national property on which economic organizations and individuals will have definite rights of utilization in their own and general national interests.

The nationalization of buildings is neither a necessity nor a logical premise of socialism. Socialism must ensure the right of a person to happiness, to a comfortable, pleasant and independent personal and family life. Hence the right of citizens to have a dwelling house and flat in a definite building is not alien to socialism. The social management of buildings in Yugoslavia has prevented speculation in transactions in dwelling houses and the possibility of enrichment of individuals. The social management has also provided for the new regulations regarding buildings under private ownership, that is, free sale of buildings and flats between individuals, under definite conditions, and between individuals and economic organizations, state bodies and institutions.

ECONOMIC PROBLEMS

Radoš STAMENKOVIĆ

World Economic Report of the UNO

THE current Report of the United Nations, dealing with world economy, is undoubtedly a good example of a study in Applied Economics and, at the same time, a model of conciseness. The experts of UNO have supplied us with abundant factual material, which they have analysed in the most expert fashion. This is a real success, when we compare the relatively small number of pages of this Report to the great number and complexity of the problems dealt with. The Report deals with the industrially developed countries of the West, with Eastern Europe, with Yugoslavia and with the most important countries of Latin America and South and South-Eastern Asia. Still, more than half of the Report is devoted to foreign trade trends and to problems of international balance of payments, discussing these problems both from the global and from the regional points of view.

The analysis of the Report is chiefly based on the comparative study of aggregate values, i. e. on gross national incomes and on their components. This is one of the characteristics of the methods used by its authors. This method enables the reader easily to see the main changes in the development of individual countries, the basic tendencies in these developments, and the economic factors which contribute to them. This method suggests the possibility of finding a common denominator for different national economies, which greatly vary both as to the degree of their development and as to their structure. But while this is very suitable for the drawing of general, synthetic conclusions, it does not take into adequate consideration data and facts which cannot be expressed in quantitative terms, and in some cases, the reader is inclined to wish for a more comprehensive treatment. This applies chiefly to the developed countries of the West, to which the least space has been devoted. The changes in economic policy which took place in the USA and some West European countries during the period from 1950 to 1953, have not been sufficiently stressed, and so one of the most important factors in the appraisal of the world economic movement has been dealt with in an inadequate way. This is to be regretted, the more so owing to the fact that the last Survey of the Economic Commission for Europe dealt somewhat inadequately with events which took place in the Western Europe because, in accordance with the resolution passed at the last year session of the Commission, its attention was focussed to the countries of South Europe. The present Report is the only one of the UNO publications which deals with the USA, as none of the regional surveys deals with that country.

We consider the above remark all the more important as the authors of the Report are not impressed by the improvement recorded in 1953 in the fields of international payments and foreign trade. Developed countries, and the

USA more than any others, exercise a decisive influence on world economic movements, in spite of the greater degree of international stability recorded in the last year. "In general, there is not sufficient flexibility in the world economy for it to withstand disturbances resulting from a substantial slackening in economic activity in any major trading country. In particular, international arrangements for dealing with the currency shortages which would arise in such a situation must be considered inadequate." The reduction of reararmament programs confronts the world once more with the alternative: depression or a constructive use of the resources set free. The solution will, of course, mainly depend upon the economic policy of the developed countries. The Report has put this question in the form of a warning but, unhappily, it has not given enough facts to enable the reader to make an estimate of future events: "The volume of government expenditure since the war has largely depended on the course of military outlays. These have recently tended to level off, and in the United States they have already started to decline. For the present, increases in other public outlays, notably public investment in highways, schools, power projects and similar works, may be maintaining total government expenditure. Non-military outlays are, however, small as compared with military expenditure, and total public expenditure in the group of developed countries as a whole will decline later in 1954 unless there are increases in non-military expenditure which are proportionately very large".

The Report, considering the year 1953 as a whole, deems it one of the best years since the end of the War. World production and consumption reached record figures and unemployment, in most of the countries, was relatively low. Inflationary pressure is, or has been in the past, removed, or has shown a tendency to abate during the last year. Sharp short-term fluctuations in the field of prices, production and international payments, which characterized the whole period of the Korean conflict, practically ceased, and in the field of international commerce and payments a greater measure of stability was recorded than during any of the previous years. Contrary to a great part of the world Press, which sees in this elements of world economic stability, the authors of the Report are of the opinion that this improvement is chiefly to be attributed to transitory factors, which leave the basic problems unsolved.

"The balance of inflationary and deflationary forces was precarious and the continuance of full employment may by no means be assured in the major industrial countries. The under-developed countries did not, in general, fare as well as the economically advanced countries, and many suffered setbacks in economic activity and in investment. There were no international plans to meet possible recurrences of the frequent, and often violent, fluctuations in

the prices of primary commodities during the past few years".

The Report has given great attention to the problems of under-developed countries. This should undoubtedly be welcomed. They are discussed in the section which deals with foreign trade and balance of payments, under the joint headline "primary producing countries" (including some developed countries such as Canada and Australia). There is also a well documented chapter dealing with the representative countries of Latin America, South and South-Eastern Asia. The data on the imports of these countries, and especially those dealing with imports of machinery and transport equipment, which are considered most important from the standpoint of economic development, show convincingly the worsening of the conditions of these countries, when compared to those prevailing in 1952. This is to be seen from the following schedule:

Imports of Machinery and of Transport Equipment from the USA and Western Europe

	(in millions of dollars)	
	1952	1953
Latin America (all countries included)	2,935	1,752
Brazil	591	298
India	271	252
Pakistan	84	58
Indonesia	135	92
Egypt	94	74

In the great majority of cases, a more favourable balance of payments — and this chiefly applies to Latin American countries which were successful in increasing their monetary reserves — was caused, not by increased exports or by more favourable terms of trade, but by import restrictions, and especially by restricted imports from dollar area. After a short-lived prosperity, which was brought about by the Korean boom, "the position of the producers of raw materials, in the first half of 1953, is closely similar to that in the first half of 1950".

Western Europe improved its dollar balances, but this was caused by various factors, some of which are of a lasting character, while others are the result of specific transitory circumstances. An increased supply of agricultural products from domestic sources undoubtedly reflects a relatively slow but constant increase of European production in the course of the post-war years. In 1953, the countries of Western Europe were much better supplied with food for men and animals, and this resulted in a considerable decrease of imports of these items from the dollar area. The supply of resources was also increased in some other parts of the world, and this enabled the European countries to replace part of their imports from the dollar area by imports from other monetary areas. In this connexion special stress should be laid on cotton which, in previous years, accounted for big dollar expenditures by Western Europe. On the other hand, considerable amounts of American military aid, which in 1953 greatly contributed to the increase of European monetary reserves, are not a factor of a structural kind, and thus cannot be considered as a final solution of the dollar problem in this part of the world. The Report is right in remarking that a relatively low level of dollar imports is the result of the fact that European industry did not work at full capacity, and also of a low stock of raw materials, and neither of these can be treated as a structural or positive factor. Finally, there is the uncertain problem of the volume of American imports. In the first half of 1953, American imports were on an unusually high level, but during the last months of the preceding year, a general downward industrial trend brought about similar results in this particular field. The effects of the decrease of American imports were not felt either at the end of 1953 or at the beginning of 1954, because the factors mentioned above acted in an opposite direction, but should this tendency continue it is bound to make the problem of relations between the European countries and the USA still more serious. The authors of this Report are not of the opinion that the increase of the gold and dollar reserves of Western Europe could resist, for a long time, the further shrinking of American imports.

The Report presents, in concise and easily understandable terms, the changes which occurred in the economic field of the Eastern European countries. The experts of UNO attribute these changes to the necessity to mitigate the

disproportions which have been caused by long-term and one-sided developments, i.e., by the insistence on heavy industry at the expense of agriculture and the industries producing for home consumption, and especially by the expansion of war industries. Some of the changes made in the course of last year will directly result in the increase of the quantity of consumer goods, but the authors hold the opinion that "undoubtedly a certain period will have to pass before the changes in investments produce any greater results".

The chapter dealing with our country is relatively short. The basic lines of our new economic policy, as well as institutional changes, are well understood and clearly outlined, as far as the space devoted to the subject and the data available to the authors at the time of the writing of this Report enabled them to do so. The importance of decentralization measures, of the new system of planning, of the new measures in the field of agriculture, are better pointed out and appraised than in the last Report of the Economic Commission for Europe. The authors of the Report call the changes of our economic system: "fundamental changes... in the scope and methods of central planning and in the management of industry". Dealing with the development of economic activity in 1952 and 1953, the authors rightly stress the difficulties we had to contend with in the past, and especially the unfavourable effects on the crops caused by the droughts of two successive years, and also the hampering effect of the burden of huge rearmament.

We may conclude with the remark that this Report is a serious contribution to economic literature, but the main criticism — too great conciseness — still remains. Contrary to the reports of some of the regional commissions of the UNO this Report sometimes makes too great a use of generalization, thus making its statements rather abstract. This is why the social and political factors which are behind various economic trends remain unexplained, making it difficult to appraise the forces at work, and predict the future developments of these trends. It should be remembered that the reports of the regional commissions of the UNO cannot fill this gap, or at least not completely, because their primary task is to concentrate on regional problems.

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Historical Survey of Vatican-South Slav Relations

ON THE APPEARANCE OF THE BOOK "VATICAN-YUGOSLAVIA"

THE war so openly approved by Pius X was not denounced by Pope Benedict XV either. Thus the war continued and ended by the defeat of the Central powers and the downfall of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. The fall of Austria-Hungary was a deadly blow to the Hapsburgs and a cause for grief in the Vatican. The Vatican was more than unwilling to recognize the new situation and the new states which rose from the ruins of former Austria-Hungary. For a whole year the Vatican remained in a state of expectation and vacillation before recognizing the new Yugoslav state. It is sufficient to recall the notorious statement given to the "Petit Parisien" by the Vatican Secretary of State, Cardinal Gaspari, in April 1919, which indicates the dissatisfaction caused by the creation of the new state and the wish for greater autonomy of the Catholic territories, all for the purpose of weakening the links between our peoples as much as possible. A whole year elapsed before the Vatican finally recognized the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (on September 6, 1919) while another 6 months passed before the first papal nuncio, Monsignor Cherubini, arrived in Belgrade (on April 6, 1920). Thus a new period in the relations between the Vatican and Yugoslavia was initiated by the exchange of diplomatic representatives. However, prior to recognizing the new Yugoslav community, Benedict XV replied by an epistle on August 25, 1919, to the greetings and representations of the Yugoslav episcopacy, which revealed the essential dissatisfaction with the new state of affairs and the position of the catholic clergy in Yugoslavia. It is true that the Pope had already been informed of the edict prepared by the National Council in Zagreb as early as November 1918, decreeing the expulsion of the Jesuits from the new state, and that preparations were under way for the implementation of land reform; together with the secret reports sent him by the clergy all this provoked the anxiety of the Pope. For Benedict XV these were "difficult changes" and he therefore "not only understands but also shares these difficulties, worries, and cares of your souls (i. e. of the Yugoslav episcopacy) which ensue from the terrible trials of these years... We consequently share your grief and our paternal heart bleeds with sorrow". But while the new Yugoslav state was contemplated in so gloomy a light and with such dismal feelings, it is difficult to find documents which would indicate that the Curia Romana took any steps whatever against religious persecutions on the Yugoslav territories occupied by the Italian army in 1918, although the fascists had not even assumed power at that time. In all territories of the Julian March, in the Croat and Slovene Littoral, as well as in the occupied parts of Dalmatia, glagolism was subjected to violent attacks, not only by the Italian "arditi" and the rampant irredenta, but by the regular army itself, which did not hesitate to prevent the clergy from preaching in the national language and destroying the old monuments of glagolism, the living testimonials of the true ethnical character of this territory. The Yugoslavs under occupation felt that the slavery under the absolutist emperor was replaced by an even more ruthless oppression. It is not known whether another "bleeding of the paternal heart" was provoked by these persecutions. It is not known what standpoint was adopted by Benedict XV towards the memorandum sent him by the Split clergy through the nuncio in Belgrade in August 1920. These loyal clergymen declared, *inter alia*:

"Since the first days of the Italian occupation, from the end of 1918 up to date, numerous unpleasant and unlawful events in the field of ecclesiastical administration have taken place in the territories inhabited by the Yugoslav native population, thus provoking vast resentment in the souls of the congregation which is otherwise deeply and sincerely devout and loyal to its catholic church". Having listed cases of overt religious persecutions (Admiral Cagni interned the Bishop of Krk, Msgr. Mahnic; the fascist mob forced Bishop Karlin of Trieste to hand in his resignation, which the Vatican accepted; numerous nationalist clergymen who continued to hold their sermons in Croatian and Slovenian were deported and interned) the clergymen stated openly that this provoked a wave of dissatisfaction among the people, "so that the general conviction prevails that the Curia Romana has joined the service of Italian imperialism in the dispute between Yugoslavia and Italy".

After the Rapallo Agreement (November 11, 1920) which severed a large part of Yugoslav ethnical territory from its mother country and handed it over to Italy, the Yugoslavs living in these areas were subjected to fascist terror, not only in public and social life, but also in church, as fascism proclaimed the complete denationalisation of the Slovenes and Croats in the Julian March as one of its primary objectives. Both the church as a whole, and her highest representatives, the archbishops and bishops in these ethnically Yugoslav territories, were the loyal servants of fascism, and it is consequently natural that they did not offer the slightest resistance to the crimes and misdemeanors of the tyrant and dictator, Mussolini, whom both Pius XI and Pius XII proclaimed "the man of divine providence". It is an irrefutable fact that Mussolini's imperialism had many adherents among the Italian cardinals, archbishops, clergymen and monks. The Yugoslav minority was again deprived of its right to use its native language in religious instruction: Slovene and Croat clergymen were dismissed and replaced by Italians who did not even know the language of their congregation. Needless to say, the church service in the Slav language, prayers in church in the native language, were banned, while sermons in Croat and Slovene were likewise abolished. This was the case both before the Lateran Pact and the Vatican-Italian Concordate in 1929, and after Mussolini's notorious diplomatic successes. The only remaining Slav prelate was the bishop of Gorica, Frane Sedej, whom it was necessary to eliminate, in accordance with the wish of Mussolini. In order to satisfy "the man of divine providence", the Vatican resorted to Machiavellian tactics with the aim of forcing the resignation of Archbishop Sedej through the Pope's personal legate, Bishop Pasetto. The promise given to Sedej by the papal legate on behalf of the Pope to the effect that his successor would be a man who would be just towards the Slovene congregation as well as its clergy, was a short-lived but all the more cynical deception. The Vatican replaced Sedej in Gorica by the arch-enemy of the Slavs, Monsignor Sirotti, who was succeeded by another Slavophobe and persecutor, Monsignor Margotti. The fascist propaganda slogan "Morte a Sedej" was soon fulfilled, as this Slovene patriot died, broken-hearted and deceived, on November 28, 1931.

The religious and ecclesiastical situation of the Yugoslav minority in the Julian March was not changed by complaints, protests, prayers or memoranda submitted at

international eucharistical congresses, and delivered to the cardinals, papal legates, Pius XI or Pius XII — The Vatican remained unwaveringly on the side of the "man of providence".

There were many cases of abuse of ecclesiastical and religious rights committed during the period between the two wars in Yugoslavia by both the higher and lower clergy, and the entire clerical press was more in the service of alien interests than those of its own people and their independence, which was threatened by many foreign powers. The connexion between the chronically dissatisfied Yugoslav episcopacy and the aspirations of the Vatican also coincided with the activities of foreign enemies both in Italy and Hungary. The Yugoslav catholic action, instead of being a non-political supra-party and extra-party organisation, as represented by its ideologist in Italy, became a powerful destructive weapon which operated its numerous organisations for the purpose of disrupting the brotherhood and unity of the Serbs and Croats, who were divided by religion. Its most important organisations, such as the "Orlovska" and, later, the "Križarstvo" represented the most extreme clerofascist factors both in rural and urban areas. This organisation soon became the trusted link of the emigrant, Ante Pavelić, who carried on his anti-Yugoslav activities in Italy, under the protection of his patron, Mussolini. The political character of the catholic action assumed particular prominence when Alojzije Stepinac was nominated bishop coadjutor to the Zagreb archbishop, and who, as the supreme commander of the catholic action after the death of archbishop Bauer in 1937, assumed full responsibility for the disruptive activities of a large part of his clergy, as well as for that of the entire catholic press. It was during the office of Archbishop Stepinac that the catholic press assumed the most hostile attitude towards the State. The situation was no better in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The clergy particularly in Croatia and Bosnia, showed their overt sympathies with the fascist conceptions, and enlisted en masse in the service of sundry foreign hirelings in Yugoslavia, as the vociferous propaganda mouthpiece which undermined the state. While some cooperated with the emigrant, Pavelić, others were clamorous extremists in the Peasant Party, which was headed by Dr. Vladimir Maček after the death of Radić. Maček could have committed no greater treason than his betrayal of the progressive and anti-clerical ideology of the founders of the People's Party, Ante and Stjepan Radić, whom the Sarajevo clericals called "papophobes and clerophobes". Maček sought to enlist the support of the clergy, whose good graces he courted and won, when he sent his delegation to pope Pius XII in 1936, bearing an epistle to which this demagogue signed himself "Dux populi Croatici", seeking favour with the Vatican for his political action. The Vatican always showed understanding for such epistles and memoranda, particularly after 1937, when the Yugoslav people repudiated the Vatican-Yugoslav concordat which was concluded in 1933, and held in high esteem by the Curia Romana, while regarded in Yugoslavia as an instrument whose aim was to insure the supremacy of the church over the State and grant the rights upon which the episcopacy had insisted ever since the inception of Yugoslavia. It is sufficient to stress that the inept Yugoslav negotiators of the concordat forgot that ever since 1898, the whole people had violently opposed the decrees of Leo XIII, and since 1906 those of Pius X, regarding the expansion, or to be more precise, the suppression of glagolism, and which was conceded by the decrees of the notorious concordat, now that the Vatican no longer had the support of the Emperor Francis Joseph. It would be hard to imagine a more unscrupulous or cynical mystification. But in spite of this, the "Osservatore Romano" contends that Yugoslavia rejected something which would have consolidated the moral unity of the Yugoslav peoples! Such arguments were advanced by the "Osservatore", not only at the time of the concordat, but also in recent polemics, when the Yugoslavs were accused of forgetting and rejecting all the good things offered them by the Vatican.

The general trend of these thousand-year relations was particularly obvious when in 1941 the Croat episcopacy prepared to celebrate the 1300th anniversary of its relations with the Holy See with great ceremony. The background of these preparations (which began in 1939) indicated, particularly after the outbreak of World War II, how deeply this celebration was imbued with politics and anti-Yugoslav feelings. And when the year of the anniversary arrived, World War II was already threatening Yugoslavia, and at last, on April 6, 1941, the day came of which Pius XI had spoken so threateningly.

It was only now that people realized what a terrible and inimical factor the catholic church, headed by an episcopacy which cared nothing for the people's interests, but only heeded orders received from Rome, had been in Yugoslavia. The directions and feelings that now prevailed in the Curia Romana were not disclosed in detail by available documents, as in the case of 1914. But when one bears in mind the way in which the catholic clergy reacted at the crucial moments in our history, as in 1848 and 1914, then the activities of the episcopacy at the beginning of the war which Hitler imposed on the Yugoslav people, in conjunction with "the man of divine providence", can be regarded as a practical implementation of the wishes and conceptions of the Curia Romana. In their destruction of the Yugoslav state the nazis and fascists were aided by all the traitorous rabble of old Yugoslavia and their already tested collaborators, the Croat and Slovene clerofascists. The Vatican did not institute any proceedings whatever against the crimes committed by the higher and lower clergy during this cataclysmic period, not even against those bishops who broke the rules of the still valid Syllabus of Pope Pius IX (in 1864), particularly articles 63 and 64.

Even at this time of trial, the Yugoslav peoples realized the close links between the activities of the high clergy and a large section of the lower clergy, and the conceptions of the Curia Romana. We will mention only a conspicuous chronological example of this obvious connexion. Archbishop Stepinac of Zagreb had, even before the former Yugoslav government left the country, paid his respects to Ante Pavelić, thus recognizing this usurper who was, needless to say, imposed by the "man of divine providence". On April 28, the same archbishop called upon his clergy — and his example was followed by the other prelates — "to be ready to answer the call to the sublime task of safeguarding and fostering the Independent State of Croatia, while Bishop Rožman of Ljubljana, likewise swore allegiance to Mussolini when he begged the Duce "to receive the assurance of his sincere loyalty and cooperation, while praying God to bless his work, the great Italian people, and the Slovene people, who will be able to live and develop under the aegis of the Roman empire". When the traitorous gang left for Rome, headed by Pavelić and his ministers and accompanied by several priests, including the vicar general of Archbishop Stepinac, Bishop Salis Sevis, for the purpose of selling a large part of Croatia to Mussolini, and offering the king and Emperor Vittorio Emanuele the so-called crown of King Zvonimir for Duke Aimone of Spoleto, the Vatican took a prominent part in the ceremonies. Pope Pius XII received the king designate of Croatia, Aimone of Spoleto, on May 17, the next day receiving with great pomp Ante Pavelić and his large retinue, whom he blessed and dismissed in a most friendly manner, with his best wishes for the prosperity of the Independent State of Croatia. All this was done while the accredited envoy of the Yugoslav government was still in the Vatican.

The gesture of Archbishop Stepinac, and his work for the Independent State of Croatia, as well as the general attitude of the Vatican which was obvious even during the initial stage of the Independent State of Croatia, became the greatest propaganda incentive for the traitorous creation of Pavelić and his gang, and was invested with a specific aspect during the whole war by the papal legate, Abbot Ramiro Marcone. Innumerable documents on this period describe these two symbols of the beginning of the occupation of Yugoslavia, which remain as a gruesome memento of the two receptions held in May 1941 — one at the Quirinal and the other in the Vatican. This heavy indictment, when history pronounces her final judgment, will be supported by an endless series of testimonials which will serve as a certain and reliable guide to the final verdict.

This purpose will be served to a modest extent by these documents. They show the general links and the indubitable coincidence of action between the Yugoslav episcopacy and the Curia Romana, in all their activities. They likewise cast a revealing light on all those destructive powers which undermined Yugoslavia on behalf of foreign interests, and disclose all the crimes committed or prepared after the end of World War I and II for the purpose of doing the maximum harm to Yugoslavia which, thanks to the People's Liberation Struggle and the People's Revolution, again emerged on the historical scene as a free and independent state, capable of defending herself from all internal and external enemies. They likewise reveal all the provocations and intrigues in the past conducted behind the scenes against Yugoslavia, and which will, we are convinced, continue in the future, this being in the thirteen-centuries-old tradition of the Vatican's attitude to the Yugoslav people.

BOOKS

Ashoka Mehta: "Democratic Socialism"

CHETANA PRAKASHAN, HYDERABAD, 1954.

THIS book by Ashoka Mehta, Indian socialist leader, was issued this year for the second time. The first edition appeared in 1951.

Ashoka Mehta is undoubtedly one of the most outstanding and prominent figures in the contemporary Indian socialist movement. Equally active in day-to-day political struggles and in theoretical elaboration of problems in the socialist movement in general, now one of the Secretaries of the Praja Socialist Party of India and one time its Secretary-General, Mehta has also published the following works: "Indian Shipping" (1940), "The Communal Triangle in India" (1942), "1857: The Great Rebellion" (1946), "Who Owns India?" (1950), "The Political Mind of India" (1952), "Socialism and Peasantry" (1953), "Politics of Planned Economy" (1953).

"Democratic Socialism" is a collection of eight lectures which Mehta delivered to the Student Section of the Socialist Party. All these lectures deal, in broad outline, with problems of the history, politics, economics and culture of the socialist movement in the world, and their purpose is to present a general picture of the development of socialist thought and practice, as well as to give directions for the students' further and more systematic study of socialism. This work, therefore, comes very close to a certain type of textbook. Mehta asks, throughout his lectures, what the Indian Socialists should take from the theory and practice of the international movement, to apply in India. In approaching the subject from this angle, he ceases to be merely an academic lecturer and gives, in general lines, and in some cases definitely, his views on the specific situation and tasks of the socialist movement in India. As a result, his book is very interesting and instructive for European readers, particularly for those who are already acquainted with the theoretical problems of socialism.

The reader who wishes to know more about social relations in Asia, and specially in India, will find in Mehta's book a number of references to the ideas and works of the more important Indian theorists who are not well-known in Europe (Dadabhai and others). He will also find some interesting views on the character and psyche of the Indians, and on the dif-

ferences between the vital attitudes and psychological profiles of the inhabitants of agrarian India and the industrially developed countries of Europe and America.

But the greatest importance of Mehta's work lies in the basic conclusions he reaches. In trying to find and fix the right path for India's socialist development, he completely rejects Soviet methods and ways.

It would be unrealistic and purposeless to try to determine, from the European viewpoint, what the tasks of the socialist movement in India should be. But since Mehta discusses the experiences of the international socialist movement, particularly in relation to the Soviet Union, it is possible to compare his views with certain conclusions reached in other countries, and so to show which of his ideas prevented him from grasping and defining what is most important for a correct understanding of the basic social and political problem of our time — the Soviet Union's real role among the progressive forces in the world.

The first basic theory presented by Mehta is that the socialist movement, viewed throughout its history, presents a kaleidoscope of the most varied ideologies, trends and movements. Thus he sees in the "socialist spectrum" all colours — from Proudhon, Voltaire and the Fabians to Stalin, Trotsky and the anarchists. Though he rejects Soviet methods, the Soviet Union is still for him a socialist country. On what grounds can one maintain that all these were socialists? Mehta, while he gives an acceptable definition of socialism, does not give a criterion on the basis of which it would be possible to determine the character of socialism.

Socialist movements, however, both in national and international proportions, do not grow in isolation, within their own confines, but in conditions of ceaseless and unremitting class struggle. It is necessary, therefore, to take this fact in account when reviewing critically the practices of those who proclaim themselves socialists.

Can a country which not only pretends to be socialist, but also the leading force in the international socialist movement, be considered as a real socialist state, even when, as a colonial power, it exploits other coun-

tries; when, as an imperialist power, it threatens the independence and freedom of other socialist and non-socialist countries?

It will suffice here to state that there is a good criterion for determining the character of socialism. This, however, does not mean that one must accept the Stalinist principle, according to which the opposing party in each controversy, i. e., one who differs in treating individual problems, must be considered as an enemy, and thus as the enemy of socialism also. There is, nevertheless, a line beyond which a given act becomes a betrayal of the struggle for socialism, and amounts to siding with the enemy, regardless of subjective justifications.

Mehta's second basic point is that India's future social order can be only a combination of socialism and democracy. Though recognizing that the Soviet Union has made great advances, particularly in the economic field, he rejects Soviet methods, because they are not being established by democratic methods, and never have been. In doing this he defines democracy as a political method, as a way of achieving traditional freedoms and a definite order of the state apparatus, i. e., as a multi-party system. If this basic point, and the argument that the one-party system of the Soviet Union has not produced an acceptable form of socialism, are correct, then there is the counterargument, which is just as correct, that the multi-party systems have not produced any form of socialism at all, not even in economically and culturally developed countries, where the socialists have been in power for some time.

From the above premises only one logical conclusion can be drawn: the essence of the problem is not to be found in the alternative of a one-party or a multi-party system. If we accept the belief that the question of democracy is, in the final aspect, a question of freedom, then it is necessary to find what freedom depends on. Marx himself gave a theoretical answer to this question a long time ago: freedom depends on property, i. e. on the management of the means of production. Since then the correctness of his thesis has been proved in many ways, but particularly by the development of social and economic relations in the Soviet Union. And it is through an analysis of these relations, which are the source of the Soviet Union's national and international practices, that we shall get the final answer to the question of whether the Soviet Union is really a socialist country, i. e., whether Soviet methods can lead to socialism in any sense.

It seems that Mehta was not aware — and there are reasons to believe that he could not have been — of Yugoslavia's efforts in building up a new kind of democracy. These efforts start from that basic matter — the management of the means of production. And the first results achieved by these efforts have put the question of one or multi-party systems on a new and a much higher plane.

A treatment of the above problems along these lines would certainly add to the clearness of Mehta's basically correct conclusions which, however, show the effects of over-simplified premises.

Zvonimir KRISTL

DIPLOMATIC AND SOCIAL EVENTS

EVENTS IN YUGOSLAVIA

25 May — President Tito gave an audience to the representatives of the Executive Bureau of the International Federation of Miners.

29 May — Mr. Carlos Unia Flerkin, the newly appointed Chargé d'Affaires of Uruguay in Belgrade, made a formal call on the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Koča Popović.

30 May — A group of American businessmen and representatives of Foreign Transactions Administration came to Yugoslavia in order to examine possibilities for closer economic relations between the two countries.

30 May — The Executive Council of the Yugoslav National Assembly granted 30 million dinars for relief to the victims of the earthquake in Greece and 3 million to the victims of the flood in Iraq.

1 June — President Tito sent his congratulations to President Einaudi on occasion of the national day of Italy.

2 June — Margot Fonteyn and Michael Somes, primaballerina and the first dancer of the Sadler's Wells Ballet, performed in "The Swan Lake" at the National Theatre in Belgrade.

3 June — Many delegates from European states attended the conference of the Technical Commission Bureau of the European Radio Union at Dubrovnik.

4 June — The Vice-President of the Executive Council of the Yugoslav National Assembly, Edvard Kardelj, received the American businessmen and representatives of the Foreign Transactions Administration.

4 June — A group of 16 outstanding Yugoslav experts on international law, including Dr. Aleš Bebler and Dr. Milan Bartoš, have completed the monograph, "Yugoslavia and the United Nations".

5 June — At the session of the Moslem Synod for Bosnia and Hercegovina it was stated that the Islam community of the Federal State of Bosnia and Hercegovina received from the State a grant amounting to 40 million dinars.

6 June — Professor Jean Brachet, the well-known Belgian scientist, is staying in Yugoslavia as a guest of the Institute for Nuclear Science, "Boris Kidrič".

6 June — Mr. Sidney Chapman, Professor of physics at Oxford University, arrived in Belgrade. He had been staying in Yugoslavia since May 24.

6 June — President Tito received a telegram from King Paul of Greece thanking him for the message he aggressed to the King on leaving Greece.

7 June — President of the F.P.R. of Yugoslavia Josip Broz Tito returned to Belgrade from the state visit to Greece. President Tito spoke about the importance of the Balkan Alliance to peace in Europe at a meeting attended by 150.000 people, who came to welcome him home.

7 June — The first Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Minister of Ethiopia to Yugoslavia, Mr. Desalen, arrived in Belgrade.

9 June — President Tito sent his good wishes to Queen Elizabeth II, on the occasion of her birthday.

9 June — A special protocol was signed in Belgrade between Yugoslavia and Israel regarding indemnity for nationalized and expropriated property of Israel citizens.

10 June — The Ethiopian Minister, Mr. Desalen, presented his credentials to President Tito.

11 June — The National Assembly of Yugoslavia, having heard the report on President Tito's visit to Greece submitted by the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Koča Popović, unanimously approved the policy of cooperation of the three Balkan states.

11 June — A delegation of the Yugoslav Air Force, headed by General Zdenko Ulepčić, went on a visit to the Swedish Air Force.

YUGOSLAVIA AND THE WORLD

25 May — Talks have begun between Austria and Yugoslavia at the Austrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs on postponing financial commitments under the 1951 agreement of the two countries.

25 May — A group of Yugoslav engineers reached Athens to take part in the international competition organized by the Greek Government for a project for the utilization of Gretean waters.

26 May — At the Innsbruck Fair (Austria) a "Yugoslav Day" was organized. The goods displayed were mostly Slovenian products.

29 May — The Yugoslav delegate, Milentije Popović, spoke at the Asian Socialist Conference about the cold war becoming an armed peace.

1 June — The Yugoslav Minister in Brussels, Marijan Barišić, handed decorations, awarded by President Tito, to three Belgian economists for their co-operation in economic matters between the two countries.

2 June — President Tito arrived by the warship, Galeb, in Greece on a state visit, accompanied by the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Koča Popović, and other high officials.

2 June — The Burmese Premier, U Nu, gave an audience to the Yugoslav delegate at the Asian Socialist Conference, Milentije Popović, and to the Yugoslav Ambassador to Burma, Krsta Bulajić.

3 June — An exhibition of medieval Yugoslav frescoes was opened in Switzerland in the presence of Yugoslav Minister, Viktor Repić, and the Swiss Minister of Internal Affairs, Dr. Eter.

4 June — The two-day conference of the representatives of Greek and Yugoslav students' organizations ended in Athens. It was agreed upon to widen the cooperation of the student organizations of the Tripartite Agreement countries.

4 June — A festival of Yugoslav dances and music was held at Cambridge, near Boston, under the auspices of the Harvard and Boston Universities. The Yugoslav Ambassador in Washington, Leo Mates, attended the festival.

4 June — The exhibition of Yugoslav photography which had been shown in Bombay and New Delhi was opened at Calcutta.

4 June — An exhibition of works by the Yugoslav painter, Nikola Martinoski, was opened at the Yugoslav Gallery in Paris.

5 June — An official announcement was made in Athens concerning President Tito's state visit, stating that the Greek and Yugoslav Governments, in full concord with the Turkish Government, had decided to expand the Tripartite Agreement into a formal alliance of the three nations. It was also announced that a consultative Tripartite Assembly, consisting of an even number of Greek, Turkish and Yugoslav deputies, would be set up.

5 June — King Paul of Greece and Marshal Papagos accepted President Tito's invitation to visit Yugoslavia.

5 June — The Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Koča Popović, held a press conference at the Yugoslav Embassy in Athens, and commented on the full agreement and identical points of view of the three Balkan states.

6 June — The Yugoslav Minister in Cairo, Marko Nikežić, went on a visit to the President of the Sudanese Government, El Azhari. He will stay in Sudan a few days.

6 June — A delegation of the Union of Yugoslav Seamen left for Western Germany on a visit to the Union of Transport and Public Services.

9 June — The President of the Republic of Indonesia, Mr. Sukarno, received the Yugoslav delegation, headed by Milentije Popović.

10 June — The Yugoslav physician, Dr. Milivoje Radovanović, was given an award for his researches by the International League Against Trachoma in Paris.

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


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
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